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BANKRUPTCY.

In re Blair, 102 Fed. 986, decides, (I) that where a creditor
collects his debt by judgment and execution within four
months prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, such
Preference,
Action by
collection does not amount to a preference unless
Trustee
the creditor has reason at the time to believe that
the debtor is insolvent, and (2) that the court of bankruptcy
has no jurisdiction to entertain an action by the trustee to
recover back such money, but the trustee is relegated to
his action in the state court. The latter part of the decision
is of course in line with Bardes v. Bank, 20 Sup. Ct. 1,000,
although the latter case had not been decided at the time.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, in order to support a
petition for involuntary bankruptcy, it is necessary that the
Provable Debt petitioning creditor possess a provable debt at the
When Act of moment the act of bankruptcy is committed. In
Bankruptcy is III re Brinckmzann, 103 Fed. 65, the petitioner
Committed
obtained a verdict in tort against the alleged bankrupt on January 13, I9OO, and on January 29 judgment was
entered upon the verdict. The alleged act of bankruptcy was
committed on January I5. Judge Baker of the District Court
(D. Ind.) dismissed the petition, on the ground that the petitioner's claim was not liquidated until the moment of judgment; therefore he did not possess a provable claim at the
time the act of bankruptcy was committed.
BANKS AND BANKING.

In De Weese v. Smit/t, 97 Fed. 309, Judge Phillips of the
District Court (D. Mo.) decided that when the Comptroller of
the Currency has levied an assessment for any
Successive
Assessments amount, no matter how small, against the stockAgainst
holders of an insolvent national bank, his power
Stockholder of is exhausted, and he may not levy a second assessNational Bank ment. The decision was strongly criticised in 39
AM. LAw REGISTER (N. S.) 185, and in Aldrich v. Campbell,97
Fed. 663, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
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BANKS AND BANKING (Continued).

reached the opposite conclusion from that of Judge Phillips.
Now that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has adhered to the result reached by the Ninth CircuitStudebaker v. Perry, 102 Fed. 947-we may regard the question as practically settled.
In Schuler v. Citizens' Bank, 82 N. W. 389, an attachment
execution was levied upon a bank deposit, and on the trial,
of the
Apicatonof the bank offered to prove that it held a note
Depositto depositor, due subsequent to the service of the
Payment of attachment, and that the depositor had authorized
it to apply the deposit to the payment of the note.
Depositor's
Note
The evidence was objected to on the ground that
it tended to add to and vary the terms of the note, but the
Supreme Court of South Dakota sustained its admission on
the ground that the depositor had constituted the bank his
agent to make the application. In Pennsylvania and many
states the courts would not be obliged to go so far for an
excuse to admit the evidence.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

In Clardy v. Wilson, 58 S. W. 53, which.was an action in a
court of Texas, it became necessary to prove the married
women's law of Tennessee. A Tennessee lawyer
Proof of
testified that the common law prevailed in that
Foreign
state, except in so far as it had been modified by
Law
statute. This was all the evidence upon the subject. The
Court of Civil Appeals, of Texas, decided that the evidence
was insufficient to overcome the presumption that the law of
Texas, and not the common law, upon the subject of married
women prevailed in Tennessee. The decision is scarcely satisfactory, for, if the court believed the evidence, it was bound
to assume the existence of the common law in Tennessee, in
the absence of statutes; and the court certainly could not
infer the existence of statutes changing the common law without proof of the same.
In Brunswick Co. v. Bank, 99 Fed. 635 (noted in 39 Ahf. LAW
N. S. 487), the Circuit Court of Appeals (Fourth
Stockholder's Circuit), decided that where an action was brought
in Maryland to enforce the individual liability of a
Liability,
Statute of: Maryland stockholder in a Georgia corporation
Limitations under a Georgia statute, the Georgia statute of
limitations and not that of Maryland applied. Coxe, J., of the
Circuit Court (N. D. N. Y.), adopted the opposite view, holdREGISTER,
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ing that in one of the numerous suits, which have been
brought all over the country to enforce the individual liability
of stockholders in Kansas corporations, the statute of limitations of the forum controls the liability: Seattle Nat.Bank v.
Pratt,103 Fed. 63.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

It will be remembered that in Ex Parte Ortiz, IOO Fed. 955,
Judge Lochren, of the District Court of Missouri, wrote a
Extension of

lengthy opinion (all of which was dictum) to the
treaty between the United States and Spain, the

constitution effect that, immediately upon the ratification of the

to Porto Rico

provisions of the Constitution of the United States extended
ex.propo vigore to Porto Rico. Now, Judge Townsend, of
the Southern District of New York, announces the opposite
view, that it requires congressional action to extend the Constitution there: Goetze v. U. S., 103 Fed. 73. The question
involved was whether or not the inhabitants of Porto Rico
were, after the treaty, inhabitants of a "foreign country"
within the operation of the Dingley tariff act of 1897. In
holding that they were subject to the tariff, Judge Townsend
relied especially upon the clause of the treaty providing that
the "civil rights and political status" of the inhabitants should
be determined by Congress, but he expressed his opinion
strongly that, even in the absence of such a provision, it
would require the authority of a treaty or act of Congress to
invest the inhabitants of Porto Rico with any rights under the
Constitution.
COURTS.

Within the past month two state courts have decided an
important point of Federal practice, which demands a ruling
Removalto by the Federal courts. When a suit has been
Feera court, removed from a state court into a Federal court,
Dimissal,

where a voluntary non-suit is suffered, or the case

is dismissed otherwise than upon the merits, may
another suit be brought in the state court upon the same
cause of action? The question was answered in the affirmative by the Court of Appeals of Kansas in Swft v. Hoblawetz,
61 Pac. 969, and by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Mcver
v. Florida, etc., Rwy. Co., 36 S. E. 775. In the litter case
Simmons, C. J., and Little, J., dissented, on the ground that
the removal operates to remove not only the suit, but also the
cause of action, so as to permanently divest the state court of
jurisdiction. R.R. v. Fulton 53 N. E. [Ohio] 265, supports the
dissenting view.
Efet
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CRIMINAL LAW.

Criminal codes are so extensive nowadays that we rarely
hear of a conviction under the common law. But such cases
occur. In Thompson v. State, 58 S. W. 213, an
Attempt
indictment was brought, under the common law,
to Sell
for an attempt to dispose of the dead body of a
D ad Body
pauper for gain. The Supreme Court of Tennessee sustained
a conviction, on the ground (i) that the sale of a dead body
was a misdemeanor at common law, and (2) that, since it was
considered to be malum in se, and not merely malum prohibiturn, an attempt to commit the crime was a misdemeanor.
Following Comm. v. Waldman, 14o Pa. 97, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas has decided that the business of
Sbaving on shaving is not a work of charity or necessity
within the generally prevalent exception to the
Sunday
Sunday laws: Er parte Kennedy, 58 S.W. 129. However
the court concedes, "that there may be isolated cases which
would suggest the necessity for a tonsorial artist," such as
"shaving a corpse."
DAMAGES.

The Code of Alabama (§ 26) provides that when the death
of a minor child is caused by the negligence of any person or
corporation, the parents or personal representative
punitive
of the child may recover fromi the wrongdoer
Damages
The
Under Statute "such damages as the jury may assess."
under
that,
decided
Circuit)
(Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals
this statute, punitive as well as compensatory damages could
be recovered: McGhee v. McCarley, 103 Fed. 55. Pardee, J., wrote a strong dissenting opinion to the effect that
the statute limited the defendant's liability to compensatory
damages.
DEEDS AND MORTGAGES.

The' Federal revenue act of June 13, 1898, provides that
where a stamp is omitted from a document without fraudulent
intent, the document may be rendered valid by a
Unatamped
Instrument, subsequent stamping. Under such circumstances
Subsequent does the validity of the instrument date from the
stamping or from the date of its execution? This
Stamping
question was presented in Wingert v. Ziegler, 46 Atl. 1075,
where the question arose as to the validity of a sheriff's sale
upon an assigned mortgage, it appearing that the stamp had
been originally omitted from the assignment by inadvertence,
and that its place had not been supplied until after the sale.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the evident
intent of Congress was to provide for the validity of the
instrument from the date of its execution; therefore the sale
was upheld.
EQUITY.

Where the legislature has provided a remedy through the
attorney-general, by which wrongs to the public through
Injunction
to Restrsan

Violation

the violation of corporate charters may be redressed, the remedy is exclusive, and a member
of the community may not obtain an injunction to

prevent such violation of the charter. Thus, in
McNulty v. Brooklyn Heights Rwy. Co., 66 N. Y. Suppl. 57,
the Supreme Court of New York refused to grant the plaintiff,
a member of the public using the railway, an injunction to
restrain the railway from charging a greater rate of fare than
that allowed by its charter, since the plaintiff did not suffer
any greater damage than the rest of the public.
of Charter

INSURANCE.

It is well settled that a fire insurance company, upon paying
a loss, becomes subrogated to the rights of the insured as
subrogation, against one who is responsible to the insured for
Prevention the loss; wherefore it results that if the insured
by Act of
releases the tort-feasor from liability, toward himInsured
self, he may not recover from the insurance company. In Packham v. German Fire Ins. Co., 46 Atl. Io66, the
fire which was caused by the negligence of a gas company,
destroyed property of the insured, in addition to that portion
of his property covered by his policy with the insurance company. The insured brought an action of tort against the gas
company, in which it was agreed that the value of the insured
property should be deducted from the verdict. In an action
by the insured against the insurance company, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland decided that, as the insured was barred
from bringing further suit against the gas company for the
value of the insured property, he could not recover from the
insurance company, since he had deprived the insurance company of its right of subrogation against the gas company.
Under precisely the same facts, an opposite conclusion was
reached in Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Co., 123 Pa. 523.
NEGLIGENCE.

In volume ioI of the FederalReporter we have the unusual
spectacle of two Circuit Courts of Appeals coming to precisely
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the opposite conclusions upon the same point of
law. McCullen v. Chicago, etc., Rwy., ioi Fed.
sparks.
66, decided by the Eighth Circuit, holds that the
Presumption fact that a fire is caused by locomotive sparks raises
a presumption of negligence on the part of the railroad company, while Garrett v. Southern Rwy., 4oi Fed. 102, supports
the opposite view. And this is not a case where the Federal
courts apply the law of the locality, but, in defiance of reason
and of a proper construction of the Judiciary Act, hold that
cases of negligence by railroads present questions of "general
commercial law," and that the Federal courts may decide
them as they please, irrespective of the state decisions.
Fire frm

t..omotive

RAILROADS.

Ever since the case of Penna.R. Co. v. Montg. Co. .Rwy. Co.,
167 Pa. 62, it has been well settled in Pennsylvania that where
Conrction a street passenger railway company, incorporated
of Railway under the Act of May 14, 1889, attempts to lay
Without
its track along a public road Without having
Authority
obtained the consent of the abutting property
owners, any such owner may restrain the construction by an
injunction. But if the property owner delays action until the
railway has been constructed, his right to an injunction is
barred, and he is relegated to his action for damages: Becker
v. Lebanon, etc., Rwy. Co., 188 Pa. 484. In tle latter case the
plaintiff, having been refused the injunction, attempted to
get rid of the railway by an action of ejectment. But the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that the railway,
having been constructed, was there to stay, and that the only
remedy of the plaintiff was an action of trespass to recover
damages f3r the increased servitude upon his land: Becker v.
Lebanon, etc., Rwy. Co., 46 At. Io96.
WILLS.
The modern tendency is to limit greatly the rule which
allows precatory words in a will to be used as the basis of a
trust. Thus in Marti's Estate, 61 Pac. 964, the
Precatory
Words to
testator gave his property to his wife absolutely.
CreateTrust The gift was followed by the clause: "Upon the
death of my wife, I desire that one-half of the property bequeathed to her shall be devisel by her to my relatives." The
Supreme Court of California decided that, under the circumstances, the word "desire" did not import a command, and
therefore no trust was created.

